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Abstract 
This study simulates the economic effects of eastern enlargement of the EU and an EU-Russian 
free trade area. The main emphasis of the paper is on the effect this would have on the Russian 
economy. The simulations were carried out with a GTAP computable general equilibrium 
model, using the most recent GTAP database 6.0 beta, which takes the former Europe 
agreements between the EU-15 and the eight new Central and Eastern European member states 
into account. The results confirm the earlier findings that a free trade agreement with the EU is 
beneficial for Russia in terms of total output but not necessarily in terms of economic welfare 
when measured by equivalent variation. The main reason behind this is the deterioration that 
would occur in Russia’s terms of trade. Improved productivity in Russia would, however, make 
the free trade agreement with the EU advantageous. 
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Economic Effects of Free Trade 
between the EU and Russia 
ENEPRI Working Paper No. 36/May 2005 
Pekka Sulamaa and Mika Widgrén 
1. Introduction 
The EU enlargement process has changed European trade relations. A common fear related to the 
wider EU is that it potentially marginalises European economies that currently are or will be left 
outside deeper and wider integration. As the major part of the continent belongs to the EU’s trade 
policy regime the question of how the enlarged EU organises its trade relations with the rest of the 
continent becomes more important. One of the key issues in this respect is the relationship 
between the EU and the Russian Federation (RF). The legal basis for EU relations with Russia is 
the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1997. 
A natural starting point in considering the possible deepening of the EU–RF economic 
relationship would be a free trade area agreement. In this paper, we examine the economic 
effects of the widening and deepening of EU–RF integration. The eastern enlargement, which 
widened the internal market (IM) to an area having almost twice as many consumers as the US, 
has an important impact on Russia. The enlarged Europe accounts for over 50% of the RF’s 
exports and imports. Economic development in the European markets can therefore have major 
effects on the Russian economy through the trade linkages.   
Eastern enlargement is likely to affect Russian trade in at least three ways. First, lower trade 
barriers within the IM divert imports from Russia to intra-IM trade. That is because lower trade 
barriers within the IM favour internal market-based exporters in terms of relative prices. This 
has a negative impact on Russian exporters, but also from the viewpoint of the EU member 
states it creates a welfare loss. The effect is likely to be rather small, however, since trade 
between the current incumbent member states and candidate countries is relatively free owing to 
the Europe Agreements. Therefore, the impact of expanding EU membership should not 
contribute significantly to trade diversion.  
Second, as Russian exporters are hit by the relative price changes and as the EU is an important 
market area for them, it is likely that Russian exporters face a negative terms-of-trade effect. 
This yields a welfare gain for the EU and a loss for the Russian economy.  
Third, within the EU, lower trade barriers stimulate trade. This gives an additional welfare gain 
to the EU countries but may also contribute positively to the Russian domestic economy. In fact, 
there is some evidence that EU integration has also stimulated external trade through increased 
demand. In the case of eastern enlargement, this effect is likely to be boosted by the fact that the 
current EU member states pursue a more liberal trade policy towards Russia than the candidate 
countries, the latter having to adopt the EU norm after accession. The direct total effect on the 
Russian economy is the sum of these three effects. 
Lower trade barriers within the EU intensify intra-IM substitution and improve the efficiency of 
EU-based firms. As trade barriers between candidate countries and the EU are already quite 
low, improved substitution is likely to have a much more substantial role in shaping events than 
the direct effects from removing visible trade barriers.  
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Eastern enlargement may also marginalise the Russian economy through foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Full membership gives the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) 
a more favourable position as host countries for FDI relative to Russia today. This may in turn 
divert integration and productivity gains. 
In this paper, we investigate the above-described effects quantitatively using a computable general 
equilibrium model. We analyse two different regime changes, EU eastern enlargement and a free 
trade area (FTA) between the enlarged EU and the RF.  
In each scenario, we have three sub-scenarios. First, there is the scenario where trade is 
liberalised, i.e. the base enlargement or the EU–RF free trade area. Second, we assume that in 
addition to the base impact the substitution between foreign and domestic goods becomes more 
elastic. This can be interpreted as arguing that deeper integration decreases market 
segmentation. Our third scenario adds productivity growth to this, which may be the result of 
more intensified competition or increased FDI. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the current state of affairs in 
trade relations between the EU and Russia. Section 3 presents the model and describes the level 
of aggregation and other assumptions we have made. Section 4 describes the simulations more 
carefully. Section 5 reveals the results and finally, section 6 concludes. 
2. Asymmetric  partners 
The EU’s eastern enlargement (the incumbent EU-15 plus the 10 new member states or EU-10) 
and the EU–Russian cooperation involve the interaction of two fairly asymmetric trading blocs, 
both in terms of size and the structure of their economies. Taken together, the total output of the 
new EU member states is roughly 4% of that of the EU-15.
1 Russia’s position vis-à-vis the EU-
25 is similar. Figure 1 shows the GDP expenditure components of the EU-10 and Russia. 
Russia’s economic size is roughly the size of the combined GDP of the new EU-10 economies.  
Figure 1. GDP expenditure components in the EU-10 and Russia (in $US millions) 
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Source: GTAP database 6.0. 
                                                 
1 This figure was derived from the GTAP database version 6.0, which is based on 2001 data. ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND RUSSIA | 3 
The GDP share of agricultural production in the new member states is nearly twice as high as 
the EU-15 average, while the per capita GDP in the new member states is nearly three times 
lower. Figure 2 illustrates the sources of total factor income (the sum of land, labour, capital and 
natural resources) by sector in Finland, Russia, Estonia and Poland. The distribution of the 
factor income shows the relative importance of the energy sectors (oil, gas and coal) as well as 
the agricultural and construction sectors in Russia. In Poland, the agricultural, trade and 
manufacturing sectors are notably more important income sources in relative terms.  
Figure 2. Sources of total factor income by sector in selected countries (%) 
 Sources of total factor income by sector (percent) 
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The level of trade protection varies between the new EU member states, the EU-15 and Russia. 
The new GTAP 6.0 beta database takes into account the Europe Agreements – the bilateral trade 
agreements that were concluded between the new EU member states and the EU-15 countries. 
Thus the effects from the EU enlargement scenario come mainly from the change in the 
common external tariff (CET) and changes in the import tariffs on agricultural products. Table 
1
2 reports the import tariff changes for agricultural products in the EU enlargement scenario.  
Table 1. Import tariff changes for agricultural products (%) 
 Finland  Germany  Russia  Estonia  Poland 
Rest 
new EU 
Rest 
FSU 
Rest
EU
Finland 0.00  0.00 0.00 -9.085 -33.267 -17.449 0.00 0.00
Germany 0.00  0.00 0.00 -10.700 -21.448 -11.752 0.00 0.00
Russian Fed.  0.00  0.00 0.00 -5.861 -12.846 -9.697 0.00 0.00
Estonia -4.384  -24.152 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  -19.445
Poland -9.422  -8.901 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  -13.828
Rest of new EU  -9.606  -10.047 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  -12.771
Rest of FSU  0.00  0.00 0.00 -10.099 -16.919 -7.011 0.00 0.00
Rest of EU  0.00  0.00 0.00 -8.112 -18.489 -12.794 0.00 0.00
ROW 0.00  0.00 0.00 -0.935 -17.784 -11.101 0.00 0.00
Notes: Change in tax on imports of agriculture from r into s.  
Source: GTAP database (version 6.0 beta) and authors’ calculations. 
                                                 
2 Tables 1, 2 and 3 show what percentage change in powers is needed to move the tariff rates to zero 
within the EU. For example, to eliminate the rate of 20% (rate%=-100), the power of the tax must change 
from 1.2 to 1.0 – a change of -16.67%. The table reports the changes on the power of tariffs needed to 
abolish the tariffs within the trade union (TU) or to conform to the EU’s external tariffs.  4 | SULAMAA & WIDGRÉN 
An FTA agreement between the EU and Russia implies a relatively larger tariff reduction to Russia 
than to the EU. Tables 2 and 3 indicate the percentage changes in import tariff powers.  
Table 2. Change in tax on imports from Russia into selected regions (%) 
tms[*RUS*] Finland Germany Estonia Poland rest New EU rest FSU rest EU ROW
AGRI -6.46 -6.30 -1.08 -1.08 -1.08 0.00 -5.94 0.00
Oil 0.00 0.00 -0.99 -0.99 -0.99 0.00 -0.72 0.00
GAS 0.00 0.00 -0.99 -0.99 -0.99 0.00 -0.08 0.00
Coal 0.00 0.00 -0.99 -0.99 -0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00
Textile -7.91 -7.93 -1.04 -1.04 -1.04 0.00 -5.20 0.00
Wood -0.09 -0.31 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 0.00 -0.43 0.00
Paper 0.00 0.00 -0.99 -0.99 -0.99 0.00 -0.05 0.00
Mineral -0.35 -0.49 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 0.00 -0.98 0.00
ELEC -0.10 -0.02 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 0.00 -0.11 0.00
ChemProd -1.85 -2.06 -1.01 -1.01 -1.01 0.00 -2.53 0.00
Metals -1.04 -1.38 -1.01 -1.01 -1.01 0.00 -1.59 0.00
Const 0.00 0.00 -0.99 -0.99 -0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trade 0.00 0.00 -0.99 -0.99 -0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00
Transport 0.00 0.00 -0.99 -0.99 -0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mnfcs -0.19 -0.46 -1.01 -1.01 -1.01 0.00 -0.48 0.00
Svces 0.00 0.00 -0.99 -0.99 -0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00
OthServ 0.00 0.00 -0.99 -0.99 -0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Source: GTAP database (version 6.0 beta) and authors’ calculations. 
Table 3. Change in tax on imports from selected regions to Russia (%) 
tms[**RUS] Finland Germany Estonia Poland rest New EU rest FSU rest EU ROW
AGRI -11.38 -12.43 -8.62 -13.72 -11.62 0.00 -12.39 0.00
Oil 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.18 0.00
GAS 0.00 -4.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Coal 0.00 -4.76 -4.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 -2.70 0.00
Textile -13.74 -14.23 -12.06 -14.86 -12.37 0.00 -14.52 0.00
Wood -15.95 -15.39 -14.80 -15.42 -15.12 0.00 -16.15 0.00
Paper -9.19 -9.38 -9.97 -6.88 -5.81 0.00 -8.35 0.00
Mineral -10.75 -12.36 -11.66 -12.97 -12.94 0.00 -12.90 0.00
ELEC -6.90 -6.22 -6.52 -9.03 -5.46 0.00 -6.11 0.00
ChemProd -7.88 -8.83 -8.33 -10.83 -9.12 0.00 -8.47 0.00
Metals -10.17 -11.57 -7.40 -11.99 -10.93 0.00 -10.25 0.00
Const 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trade 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Transport 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mnfcs -8.51 -9.58 -10.65 -8.69 -9.24 0.00 -8.99 0.00
Svces -4.60 0.00 -4.74 0.00 -1.81 0.00 -0.13 0.00
OthServ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Source: GTAP database (version 6.0 beta) and authors’ calculations. 
3.  The GTAP model and database 
The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)
3 model is a multi-regional, computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model. The inter-regional linkages originate from bilateral trade flows, while 
intra-industry linkages are captured by the regional input-output structure. The GTAP database 
covers bilateral trade data, the structure of production, consumption and intermediate use of 
commodities and services. The latest version of the database, GTAP 6.0 beta,
4 includes 87 
different regions and 57 different sectors of production.  
                                                 
3 For further details, see http://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu. 
4 Compared with the previous release (version 5.4), the new database has 13 new primary regions. 
Primary regions are the countries for which we have contributed input-output tables. The 13 new regions ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND RUSSIA | 5 
The standard GTAP CGE model assumes perfect competition and constant returns to scale. 
Imports are differentiated by their source from domestic goods, that is, the Armington 
assumption is made on bilateral trade.  
The GTAP model computes the money-metric equivalent of aggregate per capita utility for each 
region (using the regional household’s utility function). The regional household’s equivalent 
variation (EV) is the difference between the expenditure required to obtain the new, post-
simulation level of utility at initial prices.  
Each industry is represented by a single homogeneous commodity. The basic model includes 
three to five factors of production: labour (it is possible to disaggregate into skilled and non-
skilled labour), capital, land and natural resources. Labour and capital are mobile across 
domestic sectors, while land is assumed to be used only in agricultural sectors. Capital is traded 
internationally like intermediate inputs, while labour and land are not mobile across borders. 
Next we briefly present the main building block of the model. 
The regional household 
In each region, there is a regional household whose Cobb-Douglas preferences are defined over 
composite private expenditures, composite public-sector expenditures and savings. The regional 
household derives income from ownership and sales of the primary factors of production – 
capital, skilled and unskilled labour, land and natural resources. It turns out that the inter-
temporal, extended linear expenditure system could be derived from an equivalent, static 
maximisation problem, in which savings enters the utility function (Howe, 1975). This result 
provides a justification for the inclusion of savings in the regional utility function.  
Private expenditures are governed by a constant difference of elasticity (CDE) function, which 
was first proposed by Hanoch (1975). The CDE function has the desirable property that the 
resulting preferences are non-homothetic and it is more parsimonious in its parameter 
requirements than functional flexible forms. It can also be shown that the constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) function and the Cobb-Douglas preferences are special cases of the CDE 
function. Government expenditures are governed by a Cobb-Douglas preference function. 
Finally, there is inter-industry demand, whose technical specifications are described by the usual 
input-output matrix.  
Production 
Production is presented by a multi-level production function. The upper nest is a Leontief 
production function involving value-added and intermediate inputs. Value added is produced 
through a CES function of the three primary factors of production. Each intermediate input is in 
turn produced using domestic and imported components (the Armington assumption) with the 
technical process described by a CES function. Finally, imported components are a mix of imports 
from the other regions in the global model with the technical process again described by a CES 
function. 
Households own all factor supplies – land, natural resources, capital, skilled and unskilled 
labour and sell their services to firms. In the GTAP model, the sluggishness of some factors is 
allowed so that it is possible for factor prices to not be equalised within a region. Firms are 
supposed to sell output and purchase inputs (whether primary factors or intermediates) in 
competitive markets. Hence, firms make no economic profits. 
                                                                                                                                               
introduced are: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Malta, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Russian Federation. 6 | SULAMAA & WIDGRÉN 
Labour and capital are mobile across domestic sectors, while land is assumed to only be used in 
agricultural sectors. As noted above, capital is traded internationally like intermediate inputs, 
while labour and land are not mobile across borders. 
Savings and investment 
Given the Cobb-Douglas assumption about the preferences of the regional household, savings 
are a constant proportion of regional household income. The pool of savings is what becomes 
available for investments. There is a capital goods sector in each region, which produces the 
investment goods. The rate of return on capital goods is assumed to be inversely related to the 
stock of capital. The allocation of investment across regions and sectors is done in such a way 
that expected regional rates of return change by the same percentage. In the model, the pooling 
of savings and the global allocation of investment is done on a costless basis.  
The GTAP model does not contain a financial sector. An investment is therefore represented by 
a unique investment good, which is not form-specific, sector-specific or region-specific. As 
such, the model framework has a limitation in the flow analysis of FDI. The model is strongly 
relevant, however, to general equilibrium analyses of an FDI-related increase in a region’s 
capital stock as well as technology spillover. 
The macro framework 
In the GTAP model, private households and government are treated as a single decision-making 
economic agent, represented by the regional household. Private households supply productive 
factors (land, labour and capital) to producers and obtain factor income in return. Government 
revenues come from household income taxes, producers’ taxes and taxes on international 
transactions (minus subsidies if these exist). Regional income is defined as the sum of private 
households’ factor income and government revenues minus capital stock depreciation. Regional 
income in excess of regional expenditures is saved and used as investments by producers. Two 
global sectors complete the system. The global transportation sector provides services that 
account for the difference between the FOB and CIF values for a particular commodity shipped 
along a specific route. The global banking sector is designed in such a way as to secure the 
global savings-investment consistency.  
Data 
As previously mentioned, this study utilises the latest GTAP database version 6.0 beta. The 
original data consists of 87 separate regions with each region including 57 different sectors of 
production. The base year for the data is 2001.  
The original GTAP data was aggregated into 17 sectors of production and 9 regions. Since the 
emphasis of this analysis is on the EU–Russian relationship, eight out of nine regions stem from 
this. Estonia, Finland, Germany, Poland and the Russian Federation are included as own regions 
and the rest of the EU-10 and the EU-15 are assembled as two separate groups. 
The aggregation of 57 sectors of production into 17 to some extent reflects the importance of 
different sectors for the Russian economy. The complete sectoral and regional aggregations are 
available from the authors upon request. The main focus of this paper, however, is the aggregate 
effects; a detailed analysis of the effects on production sectors is left for future research. ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND RUSSIA | 7 
4. Policy  scenarios 
Impact of the EU’s eastern enlargement 
EU1: EU enlargement  
Three different EU enlargement simulations were implemented. The first is a scenario where all 
bilateral tariffs and export subsidies between the EU and the new member states (Poland, 
Estonia and the rest of the new members; henceforth this whole group is referred in the text as 
the CEEC group) are abolished, and the EU average CET is applied to the CEEC group. This 
scenario is labelled as EU1 in the tables reporting the simulation results. 
Changes in tariff rates are higher for the CEEC group than for the EU, which reflects a higher 
degree of protection in the new member states.  
EU2: EU enlargement and the internal market 
The above EU enlargement simulation did not take into account the fact that the enlargement 
involves the accession of the new members to the internal market. This will have a further effect 
on these economies through trade, FDI, domestic investment, etc. Thus, it is fair to say that the 
above simulation somewhat underestimates the long-term impact of the enlargement. Accession 
to the internal market means that the number of administrative barriers to trade, as well as the 
number of technical barriers of trade (minimum requirements, harmonisation of rules and 
regulations, etc.), is reduced. Furthermore, it may be argued that risk and uncertainty will be 
mitigated by the accession of the CEEC group to the EU. 
In order to take into account some of these integration effects, we did a second EU enlargement 
simulation with a higher degree of import demand elasticity within the customs union. This 
meant increasing the Armington elasticities for a number of key sectors. In the GTAP model, 
the Armington assumption is applied in international trade. The assumption means that 
commodities with the same name, produced by different countries, are imperfect substitutes. 
The Armington assumption implies that imperfect substitutes can have different prices in 
different countries and explains two-way trade between regions. By increasing substitutability 
between domestically produced and imported goods within the customs union, we hope to 
capture some of the IM effects that further encourage trade within the area. In fact, this scenario 
attempts to capture reduced-market segmentation, which is likely as the internal market removes 
non-visible trade barriers.  
The simulation with increased Armington elasticity values involved re-specifying the old 
commodity-specific elasticity value vector into a region-commodity matrix of values. It was 
assumed that the existing estimates for the elasticity values (ranging from 1.8 to 4.4) were 
doubled within the customs union. The model stability with respect to the elasticity values was 
checked by doing a series of simulations with less dramatic increases in the elasticity values. 
The results showed that in qualitative terms the smaller increases were consistent with the 
reported case. 
EU3: EU enlargement and total factor productivity increase within the CEECs 
The third EU enlargement scenario involved implementing the EU2 scenario with an additional 
increase in total factor productivity in the new EU member regions. Labour as well as capital 
productivity is bound to rise in the CEEC group owing to increased foreign investment, labour 
migration, increased competition, etc. This simulation involved imposing a 6% increase in the 
CEECs’ factor productivity parameter. It must be emphasised that the 6% does not correspond to a 
yearly change – rather it is some kind of approximation for a one-shot increased productivity change 
in the new, post-accession equilibrium. 8 | SULAMAA & WIDGRÉN 
Jensen, et al. (2004) analyse the medium-term effects of Russia joining the WTO and found that 
the gains originate mainly from an FDI liberalisation in services (70% of the gains). 
RU1: A free trade area between the enlarged EU and the Russian Federation 
The FTA scenario between the Russian Federation and the enlarged EU involved basically the 
same policy shock simulations as in the above EU enlargement case (removal of bilateral tariffs, 
Armington elasticity value and a factor productivity increase in the former Soviet Union, or 
FSU). The main difference here of course is that there is no CET constraint on the FSU. These 
simulations are labelled as RU1, RU2 (Armington) and RU3 (RU2 + a factor productivity 
increase in Russia). In the RU2 scenario we doubled Armington elasticities within the EU-25 + 
Russia regions.  
When interpreting the results in the free-trade-area scenarios one should bear in mind that now 
the point of reference is the equilibrium database that corresponds to the post-EU enlargement 
simulation. In the EU enlargement case, the point of reference was the base year equilibrium of 
the GTAP database 6.0, i.e. 2001. 
5.  Simulation results of the EU enlargement and the EU-25–Russian 
FTA scenarios 
Abolishing trade barriers directly affects the relative prices of intermediate inputs and final 
goods. Changes in demand for goods from different regions lead to trade creation and trade 
diversion. Free trade means that prices reflect relative scarcities so that countries can better 
exploit the gains from trade. Trade creation involves a reallocation of production between 
different regions, leading to efficiency improvements in overall production. Furthermore, the 
elimination of trade barriers affects terms of trade, i.e. the price of exports relative to imports. 
Abolishing import tariffs will improve terms of trade for countries that export their goods to that 
market. Although such terms-of-trade improvements may harm domestic production, it can 
improve welfare owing to a rise in the value of its produced goods relative to imported goods. 
All results are reported in terms of percentage changes compared to the relevant reference. In the 
case of EU enlargement, this reference is the GTAP base year (2001) equilibrium. In case of the 
FTA simulation the point of comparison is the post-EU–CEEC enlargement equilibrium data. It is 
also worth mentioning that one should read the results more in qualitative terms than attach weight 
to specific numerical values, which in any case depend on the model’s parameter values and the 
chosen ‘business as usual’ reference scenario. 
Real GDP 
Table 4 gives the simulation results on total output (real GDP percentage changes). In Table 4 
and Tables 6-9 the EU1 to EU3 figures are percentage changes from the GTAP base year 2001 
data values, while the RU1-RU3 figures are changes with respect to the database that 
corresponds to the EU1 scenario (EU enlargement has taken place). 
In the EU enlargement scenarios (EU1 to EU3) we find that the most significant effects are, as 
expected, on Poland (0.3 to 1.6%), Estonia (0.06 to 1.2%) and the rest of the new members 
(0.09 to 1.2%). The impact for the incumbent EU countries on the other hand is very small. The 
small (close to zero) negative effect on Finnish real GDP comes from a negative terms-of-trade 
effect. Overall, the results confirm the standard outcome that the new entrants are likely gain ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND RUSSIA | 9 
from eastern enlargement whereas the incumbents would face only negligible effects. The EU1 
enlargement scenario corresponds with the basic simulations by Baldwin et al. (1997).
5  
In scenario EU2, where the Armington elasticities were doubled, the real output increases in 
Poland from 0.356 to 0.484%. The growth gain, in terms of real GDP growth, increases 
considerably when all the integration effects (more competition and increased total factor 
productivity) are assumed in scenario EU3. 
Table 4. GDP effects of EU enlargement and an EU–RF free trade agreement (%) 
QGDP EU1  EU2 EU3 RU1 RU2 RU3 
Finland  -0.006 -0.004 -0.003 0.062 0.058 0.060 
Germany 0.003  0.005 0.006 0.018 0.017 0.018 
Russia 0.019  0.023 0.024 0.235 0.236 1.297 
Estonia 0.061  0.095 1.143 0.031 0.034 0.034 
Poland 0.356  0.484 1.590 0.042 0.036 0.037 
Rest  of new EU  0.086  0.118 1.182 0.038 0.047 0.049 
Rest of FSU  0.032  0.044 0.045 -0.087 -0.086 -0.079 
Rest of EU  0.001  0.002 0.002 0.008 0.007 0.008 
ROW 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Source: GTAP database (version 6.0 beta) and authors’ calculations. 
 
The simulation results suggest that the impact of eastern enlargement on the Russian Federation (RF 
in Tables 5-9) and the rest of the world are very small. This suggests that the fear of Russia’s 
marginalisation
6 as a result of the EU’s eastern enlargement is not supported by the results.  
With regard to the EU-25 and the Russian FTA scenarios (RU1–RU3) the impact for the rest of 
the countries that comprise the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
7 (shown in the 
tables as the rest of the FSU) is small, but negative. The rest of the FSU countries experience 
negative welfare effects (see Table 5 in the discussion on equivalent variation below) owing to 
the EU-25–Russian free trade agreement, which reflects the worsening of their terms of trade 
along with the effects of trade diversion. 
In an earlier paper, we utilised the GTAP database version 5.0 and Russia was part of the FSU 
bloc. Then the EU-15 member states experienced negative effects in the face of an EU–FSU 
free trade agreement with the exception of Finland. Both the EU’s southern and northern 
regions as well as Germany lost in terms of real GDP growth. It turned out that, in absolute 
terms, the losses were in these cases bigger than the gains that followed from eastern 
enlargement. For the EU-15 member states, the effects were small but for the CEECs the 
negative impact of an EU–CIS free trade area was considerable.  
 
                                                 
5 Baldwin et al. (1997) estimated that the effect of the eastern enlargement on the CEECs is 1.5%. Yet 
Havlik (2002) argues that this overestimates the impact since the Europe Agreements have gradually 
diminished trade barriers.  
6 Note that according to the simulations in Baldwin et al. (1997), Russia gains. One reason behind that is 
the fact that EU membership liberalises the CEECs’ trade policy regime towards Russia. Much of this 
effect has, however, already taken place. For a more recent view of the situation, see the discussion in 
Hamilton (2002).  
7 The CIS is made up of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Republic of 
Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 10 | SULAMAA & WIDGRÉN 
In the current study these results do not hold. It seems that the EU-25–Russian FTA is harmful 
for the rest of the FSU. In the scenario where more elastic substitution between domestic and 
foreign goods and productivity growth in Russia are assumed, the net effect for the new EU 
member states remains positive. This suggests that the whole integration process (case RU3, 
which covers eastern EU enlargement and an EU-25–Russian free trade area with full 
integration effects) has a positive output effect for Finland, the CEEC group and the rest of the 
EU countries and negative output effect for the rest of the FSU.  
Equivalent variation 
The GTAP model computes a money-metric equivalent of aggregate per capita utility for a 
region (using the regional household’s utility function). The regional household’s EV is equal to 
the difference between the expenditure required to obtain the new, post-simulation level of 
utility at initial prices.  
The EV indicates that in the EU enlargement scenario (EU1) the group comprising the rest of the 
new EU member states is in fact worse off as a result of the enlargement (Table 5). For this group, 
an allocative efficiency component
8 of the EV is positive (345.7 in the EU1 scenario) but at the same 
time, the terms-of-trade component of the EV is negative (-731.1) for the rest of the new EU 
member states, indicating that the worsening of terms of trade was the main source of the welfare 
loss.  
Table 5. Welfare effects of the EU enlargement and an EU–RF free trade agreement 
($US million) 
EV EU1  EU2 EU3 RU1 RU2 RU3 
FIN -14.43  0.02 4.31 285.30 256.81 267.59 
GER 296.64  551.48 606.60 1343.71 1287.20 1347.88 
RF 186.92  232.15 267.31 -295.50 -272.25 2887.12 
EST 7.75  7.94 57.09 46.58 40.93 42.08 
POL 162.32  -126.83 1827.26 467.26 385.57 400.59 
Rest of new EU  -283.76  -862.76 939.59 545.88 521.95 548.93 
Rest of FSU  217.77  287.72 288.80 -1029.82 -1023.17 -947.40 
Rest of EU  125.86  627.53 680.13 2139.27 2063.66 2167.50 
ROW 280.49  758.52 701.82 -1950.67 -1734.54 -1872.95 
Source: GTAP database (version 6.0 beta) and authors’ calculations. 
 
In the EU-25–Russian FTA scenarios (RU1–RU3) we see that only in the case where both 
increased import substitutability and increased productivity in Russia (RU3) are assumed would 
the FTA agreement increase welfare in Russia. The rest of the former Soviet Union group, on 
the other hand, would experience welfare losses, which reflects trade-diversion effects for the 
group. 
 
                                                 
8 Welfare would be increased owing to the fact that the sectors of production where tax/tariff distortions are 
relatively high (mainly agriculture) would be reduced as to their relative share in total production. In other 
words, if one decreases a tax or subsidy, or decreases the output of a distorted sector, the allocative efficiency 
will increase. ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND RUSSIA | 11 
Export and import volumes 
Trade effects of the EU and RU scenarios are large for both the new EU member states and 
Russia (Tables 6 and 7). One exception is Estonia, which initially enjoyed the relatively smallest 
tariff changes arising from EU membership.  
Table 6. The effects of EU enlargement and an EU–RF free trade agreement on exports (%) 
Qxwreg EU1  EU2  EU3  RU1  RU2  RU3 
FIN  0.00 0.02 0.05 -0.08 0.29 0.30 
GER  0.12 0.37 0.40 0.00 0.13 0.14 
RF  0.10 0.11 0.12 4.33 4.33 4.23 
EST  0.38 0.98 1.73 0.27 0.90 0.91 
POL 5.59  10.66  10.60  -0.25  0.45  0.45 
Rest of new EU  3.49  6.57  7.11  -0.15  0.11  0.11 
Rest  of  FSU  0.33 0.43 0.46 0.05 0.06 0.01 
Rest  of  EU  0.07 0.17 0.19 0.03 0.11 0.12 
ROW  0.05 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.06 
Source: GTAP database (version 6.0 beta) and authors’ calculations. 
Table 7. The effects of EU enlargement and the EU–RF free trade agreement on imports (%) 
Qiwreg  EU1 EU2 EU3  RU1  RU2  RU3 
FIN  -0.05  0.02  0.06 0.68 1.07  1.10 
GER  0.19 0.52 0.55  0.20  0.32  0.33 
RF  0.32 0.39 0.41  8.59  8.63  10.30 
EST  0.54 1.13 1.88  1.26  1.79  1.82 
POL  4.80 7.59 8.87  0.91  1.27  1.29 
Rest of new EU  4.52  6.72  7.61  0.41  0.61  0.62 
Rest of FSU  0.79  1.03  1.05  -2.68  -2.66  -2.53 
Rest of EU  0.05  0.18  0.20  0.11  0.19  0.19 
ROW  0.00 0.02 0.01  -0.08  -0.07  -0.08 
Source: GTAP database (version 6.0 beta) and authors’ calculations. 
 
Eastern enlargement has a significant impact on the trade of the new EU member states, as 
shown in the sectoral output change in Poland (Table 8). EU enlargement would have a 
significant negative effect on Polish agriculture, especially in the EU2 and EU3 scenarios 
(percentage changes may be large for some sectors that have a relatively small total output 
share, unlike agriculture in Poland). The EU-25–Russian scenario would also harm Polish coal 
production to some extent. 
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Table 8. Industry output of commodity i in Poland (output changes) 
qo[*POL] EU1  EU2  EU3 RU1 RU2 RU3 
Agri. -0.74  -4.35  -3.65  0.30 0.29 0.29
Oil 0.16  0.78  1.81  -2.03 -2.20 -2.32
Gas -0.41  -0.31  0.66  1.78 1.69 1.69
Coal -0.66  -1.06  -0.12  -0.29 -0.26 -0.26
Textile -1.16  -1.46  -1.00 -0.23 -0.11 -0.13
Wood -0.11  2.02  2.41  -0.74 -0.48 -0.48
Paper -0.11  0.89  1.75  -0.19 -0.19 -0.17
Mineral 0.42  2.01  3.03  0.15 0.11 0.15
Elec. 0.98  3.77  4.73  -0.59 -0.53 -0.58
Chem. prod.  -0.96  -0.86  -0.06  0.49 0.42 0.45
Metals 1.12  2.74  3.38  -0.75 -0.63 -0.63
Const 1.10  0.86  2.66  0.47 0.38 0.37
Trade 0.11  0.23  1.49  0.13 0.11 0.11
Transport 0.35  1.24  2.06  -0.19 -0.12 -0.12
Mnfcs. 0.70  2.91  3.77  -0.64 -0.57 -0.59
Services -1.97  -4.06  -3.06  -0.06 -0.05 -0.06
Other serv.  -0.08  0.27  1.50  0.01 -0.01 -0.01
CGDS 1.59  0.98  3.14  0.72 0.58 0.57
Note: CGDS refers to capital good sector – change in capital good production. 
Source: GTAP database (version 6.0 beta) and authors’ calculations. 
Terms of trade 
Table 9 gives the terms-of-trade effects. For the enlargement scenarios we expect that EU 
member states would see an improvement in terms of trade. The results confirm this with the 
exception of scenario EU1, where Finland would have a small terms-of-trade deterioration.  
Table 9. The effects of EU enlargement and an EU–RF free trade agreement on terms-of-trade 
(%) 
Terms of trade  EU1  EU2  EU3  RU1  RU2  RU3 
FIN  -0.02  0.00 0.01 0.54 0.48 0.50 
GER  0.04 0.07 0.08 0.18 0.17 0.18 
RF 0.16  0.20  0.24  -1.25 -1.22 -1.29 
EST 0.08  0.05  -0.10  0.78 0.67 0.69 
POL  -0.83 -1.74 -1.71 0.68 0.55 0.58 
Rest of new EU  -0.32 -0.79 -0.87 0.35 0.32 0.34 
Rest of FSU  0.34  0.45  0.45  -1.65 -1.64 -1.52 
Rest  of  EU  0.00 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.09 
ROW 0.00  0.01  0.01  -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Source: GTAP database (version 6.0 beta) and authors’ calculations. ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE EU AND RUSSIA | 13 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have simulated the economic effects of eastern enlargement and an EU–
Russian free trade area. The main emphasis of the paper is the effect this would have on the 
Russian economy. The simulations were carried out with a GTAP computable general 
equilibrium model using the most recent GTAP database 6.0 beta, which takes the former 
Europe Agreements between the EU-15 and eight new CEECs into account. 
We distinguished between three variants for projecting the effects of integration. The baseline 
integration scenarios (eastern enlargement or the EU–Russian free trade area) cover only 
reductions in trade barriers. Then, as a second stage, we assumed the increased substitution 
between import goods and their domestic counterparts. The third pair of simulations assumed 
improved productivity in either the new EU member states (eastern enlargement) or in the new EU 
member states and Russia (the EU–Russian free trade area). 
The eastern enlargement scenarios confirmed the usual result that the incumbent EU countries 
would gain very little. This also seems to hold for the new member states, in contrast with 
earlier findings. The equivalent variation even turns negative without an assumption concerning 
improved productivity. It seems that the Europe agreements have already brought the major part 
of their gains for the new member states. 
When interpreting the results of the FTA scenarios, one should bear in mind that now the point 
of reference is the equilibrium database that corresponds to the post-EU enlargement simulation. 
In the EU enlargement case, the point of reference was the base year equilibrium of the GTAP 
database 6.0 beta, corresponding to year 2001. 
Ex-ante one would expect that a free trade agreement would have relatively little effect on the 
EU-25 economies. The real GDP in Russia is about 10% of the enlarged EU’s real GDP. The 
size of the Russian economy is roughly the same as the total economy of the new member 
states. Trade between Russia and the EU is also asymmetric. The EU’s exports to Russia are 
mainly manufactured goods, while half of Russia’s exports to the EU consist of energy and raw 
materials. 
In the RU1 to RU3 scenarios the rest of the CIS countries (the rest of the FSU) face a negative 
impact, which is not surprising. Interestingly, Russia too would encounter negative welfare 
effects in the RU1 and RU2 simulations. Only in the RU3 simulation, where there are full 
integration effects in Russia (increased product substitutability and productivity gains) is the 
FTA agreement beneficial.  
The magnitude of the trade effects owing to an EU-25–Russian free trade area are almost of the 
same magnitude as the accession alone. On the one hand, this finding suggests that the trade 
creation effects are considerable; but as there is almost no change in the trade of rest of the 
world, trade diversion seems evident as well. 
Regarding the EU-25–Russian free trade area, the current EU countries and the new member 
states would experience qualitatively similar terms-of-trade effects. Notably, Russia’s terms of 
trade are deteriorating, as is the case for the rest of the FSU as well. This seems to be the major 
contributor to the negative welfare effects that these areas would face.  
From the viewpoint of the EU-25 as well as that of Russia, the EU–Russian free trade area 
would, like the eastern enlargement, be slightly beneficial with regard to output but not 
necessarily in terms of welfare gains. If a significant improvement in productivity is assumed 
for Russia, it would obtain economic welfare gains from a free trade agreement with the EU-25 
in both regards. The only region that loses from the agreement vis-à-vis output is the rest of the 
FSU. If equivalent variation is used for evaluation, the rest of the world would also lose. | 14 
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